IntroduCtIon
A significant effort was made during the last decade for the development of the proper infrastructure that would provide most of the appropriate elements that are essential for the international adoption of electronic commerce (e-commerce). The most important requirements that were addressed are the international interconnection that was achieved by the rapid development and spreading of Internet, the domination of extensible markup language (XML) and XML schemas that guaranteed the interoperability among different architectures, different platforms, and different development languages, and finally the development of standards such as the XML common business library (xCBL) that provide a set of XML building blocks and a document framework that allows the creation of robust, reusable XML documents in order to facilitate the global trading.
Nevertheless, a crucial role on the adoption of e-commerce plays the definition of the European Union legal framework. The current legal framework achieves to cover the legal substance of technological possibilities of electronic commerce only at one point. The directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC) (European Parliament, 2000) has established a legal framework for suppliers, making it possible for them to do business with customers in other member states without having to apply the laws of those member states.
At the same time, there is a set of European Union directives that clarify the principles that are applied in some of the e-commerce's processes. The Council Directive 2001/115/EC (European Parliament, 2001) of December 20, 2001 , amends Directive 77/388/EC with a view to simplifying, modernizing, and harmonizing the conditions laid down for invoicing in respect of value added tax and the Directive 2004/18/EC (European Parliament, 2004) of March 31, 2004 , on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts, and public service contracts constitute representative examples. The article is focused on a specific aspect of e-commerce, the electronic ordering (e-ordering) service. The legal framework that concerns the e-ordering service is determined mainly by the EU Directive 2000/31/EC.
The ordering service as a process of ecommerce should allow for true business-tobusiness (B2B) secure collaboration by giving the possibility to salesmen and purchasers to execute trustful processes of electronic trading for opening new markets. Among the advantages that e-ordering offers include are the generation of more revenue, improvement of sales efficiency, increase of customer retention, accuracy and efficiency of sales, and elimination of costs.
The e-ordering implementations have to satisfy several security and privacy requirements. These requirements arise from the fact that the ordered documents may contain business data (e.g., VAT code, items) or private data that should not be revealed or modified.
They should be trustful documents requiring all four dimensions of security (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, nonrepudiation) and privacy.
The existing e-ordering systems discriminated in two types. The first are ERP inclusive systems (e.g., SAP) that manage the sources within and beyond an enterprise. These systems are not affordable for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), blocking them from entering B2B profitable applications. In addition, although they satisfy several security requirements, they do not achieve interoperability. The second type is customized solutions offering e-ordering as an autonomous service. Existing systems of this type ignore various security and privacy requirements.
The purpose of this article is the presentation of the security and privacy requirements of an e-ordering service, as well as the proposition of an open, affordable, and scalable e-ordering architecture that satisfy these requirements complied with EU regulations and directives. The proposed system, in order to meet these objectives, is built using open technologies, such as XML, XML cryptography, public key infrastructure (PKI), Web services policy language (WSPL), and Web services.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the legal framework which supports electronic ordering, it illustrates the fundamental security and privacy requirements of e-ordering and presents the existed e-ordering implementations. Section 3 describes in detail the e-ordering system architecture and its components. Section 4 provides an assessment (technological, organizational, legal, and business) of trustful e-ordering architecture (TOES) architecture and finally Section 5 presents our conclusions and areas for further research.
state-of-the art and requIreMents
In this section we present the relevant European legislation for secure e-ordering systems, as well as the security and privacy requirements of the e-ordering services (Polemi & Papaster-giou, 2006a , 2006c , 2006d as implied by the W3C working draft "Web Service Architecture (WSA) Requirements" (Austin, 2005) and by the EU legal framework. Current implementations are assessed against these requirements.
legal framework
According to the European Union, fundamental objective constitutes the harmonization of national legislative framework for the provision of a uniform framework for the European market. A harmonized legal framework will encourage the adoption of various cross border service as the e-ordering. The community directives that aim in this harmonization include: 1995 (European Parliament, 1995 , on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. iv. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of March 11, 1996 (European Parliament, 1996 Electronic ordering implementations, in order to be harmonized with the legal framework of EU member states, have to comply with the regulations and the directives that were reported previously.
security requirements
The e-ordering systems have to satisfy certain fundamental security requirements:
• AR006.2.1: Authentication of origin. The confirmation of the source that sends the orders is a critical issue of the ordering exchange process and its identity needs to be proven. • AR006.5: Integrity of the content. During transmission or storage time, the orders should be protected from unauthorized (intentionally or accidentally) modification or their replacement. • AR006.6: Nonrepudiation of origin and receipt. The ordering exchange can not been denied neither from the sender nor from the recipient.
• Long lasting integrity. The electronic signatures of the orders should remain valid over long periods. • AR006.4: Confidentiality and privacy. The orders should be readable by the designated recipients.
• Integrity of the sequence of the orders. The avoidance of missing orders. • AR006.1: Availability. The e-ordering service will be able to be used at any time from the enterprises.
• Secure electronic storage. Primary requirements, such as authenticity, integrity, and readability, should be guaranteed through-out the storage period of the e-ordering documents (European Parliament, 1996) . • Legal compliance. All e-ordering implementations have to be compliant to the regulations and directives that described in Section 2.1.
The above requirements impose restrictions that e-ordering systems have to take into account.
Privacy requirements
Privacy (Polemi & Papastergiou, 2006b ) has an important role in the e-ordering service and is discriminated in two directories. The first one concerns the privacy of the information that is published in an untrusted universal description, discovery, and integration (UDDI) protocol. The requirements of this category are the following:
• UDDI Privacy. The e-ordering service can be published to an untrusted directory where the (existed or future) user can invoke it (Carminati, 2005) . • Requestor Privacy. The Web service requestors' query information should be protected (Carminati, 2005) .
The second direction has as primary scope to facilitate the interaction and strengthen the interoperability of the participants. These requirements are described as follows:
• AR0020.1: The WSA must enable the expression of a Web service's privacy policy statements. • AR0020.3: The WSA must give consumer access to a Web service's advertised privacy policy statement. • AR0020.5: The WSA must enable privacy policy delegation and propagation. • AR0020.6: Web services must be allowed to support interactions with anonymous parties.
The e-ordering systems have, as obligation, to implement the appropriate privacy countermeasures in order to satisfy all the above mentioned requirements.
Existing E-orderings Implementations
Existing solutions have not achieved addressing all the above-mentioned requirements.
• Some companies, acting as trusted third parties, offer the service of e-ordering (Accountis) . In this solution, the orders are stored and managed centrally, and in certain cases the orders transform from one format to another (E2open). These solutions face interoperability problems, furthermore, in most cases, the orders are not sent or stored in their original format (as created by the sender).
• Most of the solutions are EDI based (Channelinx) revealing deficiencies such as lack of perseverance in the new models of information exchange and they require expensive software. Moreover EDI messages are rigid (e.g., adding new fields cause implementation difficulties).
• Some solutions enable order transaction via e-mail. In certain cases, some of these solutions give the possibility to the parties to access a secure server in order to administrate their orders (Emergis) . The lack of security during the storage time and the weak archiving process (causing the missing orders) are critical issues in these solutions.
• The use of technologies such as message authentication code (MAC) (Message Authentication Codes (MAC), 2002) and secure sockets layer (Secure Sockets Layer [SSL] ) is a very common solution in the e-ordering transaction over the Internet in order to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and authentication during the exchange of orders (Elma) . (Accountis; E2open). However, using these technologies, the security requirements can not be satisfied during the storage time.
• Some solutions use PKI and XML signatures in order to achieve nonrepudiation (E2open) . Unfortunately, the validity period of the electronic signatures is limited.
• Via a component of a financial suite, the possibility of order management is provided. Moreover, an autonomous Web-based eordering facility is used to create e-orders (Accountis; Channelinx).
• Web services and XML are technologies that are used by a number of solutions (Chen & Meixell, 2003) . Nevertheless, in these solutions security and privacy remain a crucial issue.
• The XML advanced electronic signatures (XAdES) standard is used from some eordering services aiming at the long-term preservation of digitally signed documents. An important drawback of this standard is that only individual signatures are renewed and furthermore the renewed signature does not include all the preceding signatures of the document.
Most of the above solutions satisfy a subset of the security requirements and ignore the privacy requirements as described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. Our proposed architecture aims to fill this gap which creates the lack of an e-ordering system that addresses all aforementioned requirements.
toes: a seCure and trustful e-orderIng servICe
In this section we will present the standards that are adopted by TOES in order to address the requirements that have been posed. Furthermore, we describe the proposed e-ordering service architecture, the entities that are involved in the service, the procedures, and all the necessary steps that these entities have to follow in order to complete an e-ordering transaction.
adopted standards
The proposed system utilizes XML and Web services as the basic technologies for the formulation and transfer of messages within the platform. The choice of these technologies is based on the achievement of security, privacy, and interoperability.
The message format integrated in the system uses the XML common business library version 4.0 (xCBL 4.0) (xCBL.org, 2003) , which is a set of XML building blocks and a document framework that allows the creation of robust, reusable XML documents to facilitate global trading. Furthermore, xCBL has been also adopted as the used schema for the e-order documents and for the representing of the buyers', senders', and items' profiles that are stored in a native XML database. The selection of xCBL is based on its maturity level of completeness and clarity that gives the possibility to a system to be parameterized properly in order to be used in different cases. The use of XML for formatting the e-order document allows for the use of XML digital signatures and the integration with a set of standards as has been specified by the ETSI ESI.
The Furthermore, TOES, in order to achieve a secure and trustful e-order transaction, uses an exchange mechanism that relies on the simple object access protocol (SOAP) (Hartman, 2003; Nadalin, 2004) messaging with Web services security extensions. SOAP is a lightweight protocol intended for exchanging structured information in a decentralized, distributed environment such as the proposed architecture.
In such an environment the interoperability has been ensured and strengthened by the use of registries that are based on the UDDI (Bellwood, 2002) . UDDI creates a standard interoperable platform that enables companies and applications to publish and retrieve the description of the e-ordering service. This allows for the automatic, dynamic, and quick accomplishment of the e-order transaction among systems that apply similar message formats.
The published services' description is formulated as specified by the Web services description language (WSDL) (Christenssen et al., 2001 ) and the WSPL (Anderson, 2004) . The WSDL has a basic objective to represent the functional aspects of the e-ordering service. Specifically, it is used to describe the interfaces of a service and how to invoke it. TOES uses WSPL (Polemi & Papastergiou, 2006b ) in order to represent all nonfunctional attributes of the offered service. For example, the WSPL describes the confidentiality mechanisms, the identity, the role, and the authentication attributes each participant supports and requires.
service architecture
Most of the above solutions satisfy a subset of the security requirements and ignore the privacy requirements as described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. Our proposed architecture aims to fill this gap which creates the lack of an e-ordering system that addresses all aforementioned requirements. Figure 1 depicts the four major entities that take part in the e-ordering process. The two major entities that participate in the transaction are the sender that initiates the process and the receiver that receives the order. A detail description of these entities is the following: a. The Trusted Third Parties (TTPs): The trusted third parties that are required in the proposed architecture are a certification authority (CA), a registration authority (RA), and a time stamping authority (TSA Figure 1 . Entities of the e-ordering service service, publishes it in the UDDI registry, and defines a specific privacy policy that corresponds to the used mechanisms of the e-ordering service. It also communicates with the trusted third parties to get the proper security credentials. d. The Receiver: The receiver is an organization (e.g., store, private user) that hosts TOES architecture or a similar one. The receiver retrieves the e-ordering service from the UDDI, it is configured to understand the messages, and defines a specific privacy policy that corresponds to the used mechanisms of the e-ordering service. It also communicates with the trusted third parties to get the proper security credentials.
toes Components
TOES architecture includes a set of components that play an important role in order to satisfy the e-ordering's requirements. These components, as presented in Figure 2 , are divided in two distinct tiers, the sender client and the sender server, that are described in details as follows.
Sender Client
The major components of the sender client are the smart card in which the user certificate is stored, the keystore that contains the applet's and the sender WS's certificate, and the client applet that provides the end user interface. The client applet is running on an Apache HTTP Server 2.0.49 (Apache HTTP Server 2.0.49) which acts as the Web server. The applet gives the possibility to the user to create, manage, and send orders. In order to achieve this, it communicates with seven entities: the smart card to sign the orders, the CA to request certificate status information (Kaliontzoglou, 2003) , the TSA to request time stamps in order to produce XAdES signature (Kaliontzoglou, 2003) , the applet keystore to receive the appropriate certificates, the XML database to retrieve order's information, the sender WS in which the orders are sent, and the UDDI registry to publish the e-ordering service.
Sender Server
Sender server includes the necessary infrastructure in order to accomplish all the storage's and dispatch's mechanisms in a trustful manner. It is composed of the keystore that contains the sender certificate, the applet certificate, and the receiver certificate, a database in which the orders, the receipts, and the sender WS are stored. The Exist (Meier, 2001 ) is used as database that constitutes an open source native XML database.
Sender WS has the responsibility to dispatch the e-order to the receiver. The accomplishment of this goal is achieved via the Figure 2 . TOES architecture entities communication with the following five entities: the user interface that sends the orders to the Web service sender, the XML database to store orders and receipts, the sender keystore to receive the sender's and receiver's certificates, the receiver which receives the orders, and the director operator from which retrieves the URL of the Web service receiver. Director operator is composed of: Sender WS, XML Database, and UDDI Locator WS are integrated into Apache Tomcat 5.5 application server (Jakarta Tomcat 5.5.4).
e-ordering Process
The sender and the receiver of the order, before initiating the e-ordering process, have to accomplish a set of actions which are divided in three phases.
The first phase includes the definition of the privacy policy of the sender and the receiver. The second phase constitutes the communication with the UDDI registry for the publication and retrieval of the e-ordering service. In the second phase the sender and the receiver have to communicate with the trusted third parties for acquisition of the security credentials.
Phase1-privacy policy: The sender and the receiver have to define the necessary privacy policies using the WSPL. Each of the privacy policy documents is signed using the qualified certificate of the corresponded party. The major objective of the defined privacy policy (Anderson, 2004) is to convey conditions on an e-ordering interaction between two Web service endpoints. All information provided in the privacy policy is aimed to describe the capabilities and requirements of the Web service entities.
Phase2-Service publication and retrieval: The sender produces the WSDL document and uses a standard hash function to a subset of the e-ordering service information that the sender wants to publish to the UDDI registry. The sender's information that remains as clear text corresponds to the contact information, the URL of the WSDL document, and the URL of the privacy policy document. All other information such as Web service properties and private data (e.g., VAT code) are hashed. Then the receiver searching for a service with certain properties generates a query specifying all the conditions on the properties as hashed values. The UDDI registry returns to the receiver the URL of the sender's WSDL document. Now the receiver has the description of the Web service in order to configure its service to be able to receive and send SOAP message according to this description. Furthermore, the receiver produces the WSDL document that corresponds to its service and publishes its service to the UDDI registry following the same way.
Phase3-Set up security credentials: The sender and the receiver take part in the registration and certification procedures as demanded by the certification practice statement of the TTP, and setup the acquired security credentials, in order to achieve a secure communication. Moreover, they have to define the necessary signature policies that will be referenced while producing and validating XAdES signatures, as described in the XAdES standard (Kaliontzoglou, 2006) .
When the sender and the receiver have accomplished the aforementioned phases, they are now ready to initiate the ordering process. The necessary steps to complete this process are illustrated below:
Step 1: Access User Interface and Create Order Document (Figure3: Actions 1-5)
The e-ordering process is initiated by an employee of an organization who authenticates her or himself by means of a smart card and PIN
Figure 3. Sequence diagram for the e-ordering process (Actions 1-15)
through the user interface. The user accesses a user interface using a browser. The user interface enables the user to complete the necessary data in order to create an order or to manage existing orders. The data input is automatically checked for prevention of errors and is used to create the order document.
Step 2: Sign Order Document (Figure3: Actions 6-15)
When the order document has been created, the user interface transparently gathers the time stamps and revocation status information data from their respective sources. Then, the XAdES signature is formulated based on the cryptographic primitives in the smart card, the user's certificate, and the order data. At the end, the order document is signed using the qualified certificate of the user which is located in the smart card.
Step 3: Dispatching Signed Order Document to Sender WS (Figure4: Actions 16-30)
After the successful creation of the signed order document, the order document is packaged in a SOAP message employing the WS security extensions and is dispatched to the sender's Web service.
When the sender WS receives the UDDI registry URL, it queries the registry in order to receive the privacy policy's and the WSDL's documents of the deceiver.
All search criteria of the query such as VAT code are hashed. The sender WS retrieves the receiver's and the sender's privacy policy, verifies the digital signatures of the documents, and merges the two policies in order to produce a third one. The sender WS checks the merged policy in order to decide if it is acceptable and thus the e-ordering transaction can be accomplished. Then, the order is packaged in a new SOAP message in which the sender WS applies the acceptable policy, employing the WS security extensions.
The sender WS retrieves the receiver's WSDL document, parses I,t and retrieves the URL of receiver's Web service.
Step 4: Receipt of Order at Receiver WS (Figure4 : Actions 31-36)
The protected SOAP message, that has been created, is dispatched over HTTP to the receiver WS. The receiver WS receives the order and follows a fully automated process that requires no human intervention. The SOAP message containing the orders are decrypted with the receiver server's private key and the validity of their WS Security extensions digital signature is verified, so that the point of origin is validated.
Then the e-order document itself is extracted. Validation of the embedded cryptographic information firstly requires communication with a CA for verification of the credentials that were used to sign the e-order as well as verification of any timestamp that was included in the document. Finally the XAdES signature is validated.
Step 5: Storage of Order at Receiver's XML Database and Dispatching a Receipt (Figure5 : Actions 37-38)
The receiver WS forms a receipt that references to the received order and contains the status of the whole process. Then it stores the e-order and the constructed receipt in a database. From now on, the e-order is available for parsing and further processing by the receiver's users. The receipt is packaged in a SOAP message in which is applied the WS security extensions and is dispatched to issuer WS.
Step 6 The sender WS receives the SOAP receipt, decrypts it, and verifies the WS security digital signature. Finally it extracts the receipt and stores it in its XML database along with the sent order. assessMent TOES achieves to face a set of issues (security and privacy) in a effective manner. In this section the assessment of the proposed system against specific criteria (i.e., technological, legal, business) is presented.
security and trust
Security is the main aspect of each offered eservice in order to meet its business goals. The organizations face serious security problems and they desire to gain the trust of users and to eliminate the lack of confidence.
The proposed system, in order to support a secure production and exchange of e-orders, addresses the security requirements as described in Section 2.2. The countermeasures that are adopted are the following:
• Authentication of origin: Using XML digital signatures in combination with tamper resistant cryptographic modules such as smart cards.
• Integrity of the content: Using a cryptographic hash function that provides message integrity checks as part of the digital signature process.
• Non-repudiation of origin and receipt:
Using digital signatures and time stamping.
• Long lasting integrity: Using ETSI TS 101 903 that produced ETSI to define XML formats for advanced electronic signatures. A XAdES electronic signature also offers nonrepudiation based on a predefined signature policy.
• Confidentiality and privacy: Using XML encryption as specified in the W3C recommendation and the Web services security recommendation for encryption in SOAP messages.
• Integrity of the sequence of the orders:
Imposing a tight sequence issuance scheme by having a reference number embedded in each order.
• Availability: E-ordering Web services are published in registries.
• Secure electronic storage: The XML orders are stored with the original format in which they were received. Furthermore, the combination of XAdES and a native XML database guarantees the secure long-term archiving of e-orders.
All the adopted security mechanisms are directly embedded within the proposed system and address the security requirements based on specific policies.
Privacy
All the restrictions that have been imposed by the requirements described in Section 2.3 are faced by the following technical countermeasures:
• UDDI privacy: Using hashing techniques to a subset of published data so they can not be revealed.
• Requestor privacy: Searching for a service with certain properties, generating a query specifying all the conditions on the properties as hashed values. As a result, the untrusted directory can not infer the search criteria.
• AR0020.1: The privacy policy is expressed using WSPL. • AR0020.3: The privacy policy is published in a UDDI registry. • AR0020.5: The privacy policy is used in order to convey conditions under which the e-ordering service is provided. • AR0020.6: Retrieving the privacy policy from UDDI registry anonymously.
The adoption of these countermeasures is crucial for the effectiveness of the proposed architecture.
legal Compliance
The major objective of each e-ordering implementation is to be compliant with the underlying legal framework described in Section 2.1. The legal framework defines the rules that must be applied in every electronic document transaction. The directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC) dictates the main requirements for the e-ordering solutions. The proposed system satisfies these requirements as follows:
• Providing a response to every dispatched e-order.
• Providing the possibility of management of the e-order documents that have not been sent yet.
The European Union directives as described in Section 2.1 impose the need of adoption countermeasures, in addition to the security countermeasures that are presented in Section 4.1. These further countermeasures are the following:
The aforementioned countermeasures are integrated in the proposed systems respecting the EU Directives.
Interoperability and scalability
Interoperability is difficult to accomplish because of the heterogeneity of the different technologies and systems. Interoperability constitutes an objective that requires identifiable and publishable e-services in order to be achieved. In the same manner, scalability is a requirement that have to be satisfied, so that the quality of the offered service remains in an acceptable level.
TOES addresses interoperability and scalability by using widely deployed standards and technologies. Specifically, XML and Web services constitute the most appropriate choices, in combination with open source Java tools. The proposed system utilizes WSDL for the description and UDDI for the publishing of the e-ordering service, while it uses SOAP for the transactions of the e-ordering documents.
Performance
TOES achieves particularly satisfactory performance via the adoption of digital subscriber line (DSL) technology. The use of XML and Web services, as the basic technologies for the formulation and transfer of messages within the platform, expands the size of data several times over. The increase of the data size is translated into more storage, transmission, and processing time. For example, a SOAP message demands extra bandwidth, while in order to format and parse the messages, more processing is needed.
Despite these drawbacks, the advantages of XML and Web services (Hartman, 2003) outweigh the additional storage requirements, transmission time, and processing needed. The flexibility offered by these technologies overcomes differences in platforms, development languages, and architectures, allowing organizations to perform processing tasks cooperatively. Using XML and SOAP, systems from different domains with independent environments, different architectures, and different platforms can engage in a distributed endeavor to address business needs.
Furthermore, a major factor that affects the performance of the TOES is the choice of the proper algorithm for the encryption of the SOAP messages. Secret key encryption is much faster than public key encryption, but secret keys do not scale as well as public keys. So, in order to achieve the higher performance, the adopted process is the following: a one-time generated secret key is used for the encryption and the decryption of the data, using a symmetric algorithm (triple-DES). The generated secret key is encrypted using a public key algorithm (RSA-V1.5) and the encrypted key is embedded in the SOAP message.
Cost
TOES is an affordable solution. SMEs do not have to invest in expensive ERPs in order to offer e-ordering. On the contrary, the costs of TOES adoption are kept low due to the use of open source software (i.e., Exist, Axis 1.2, Apache Tomcat 5.5, and Java Web Services Developer's Pack) and are limited to the operation costs. Furthermore, TOES does not need the existence of dedicated employees that are required to have a specific education background, while the system does not pose additional training and managing requirements.
The tables that follow demonstrate the significant cost and time benefits that the sender and the receiver of e-order receive from the utilizing of TOES platform. Tables 1 and 2 present a reduction of the time's process and of the cost for the receiver's and sender's organizations, respectively. The time's reduction is reached 75% and 62.5% of the total time of the issuer and the receiver, while the cost is reduced at 70.89% and 59.61%, respectively.
Benefits
The main anticipated benefit by adopting TOES is the significant operating costs reduction, which involves the minimization of the workload required for handling paper orders, as well as the expenses involved in printing and delivering them and without purchasing expensive ERP solutions.
TOES service provides a suitable, friendly interface to the authorized user for inputting the necessary data for the order fields that have been defined in an XML document. A native XML database ensures that the XML orders are stored exactly in the original format in which they were received for any future audit.
TOES 2.3. In order to achieve these fundamental objectives, the architecture is based on XML, XML digital signatures and encryption, xCBL, WSPL, and Web services. Our future plans are to expand our e-ordering service to several directions, with the fundamental objective in mind to enhance the functionality and interoperability features of the proposed architecture. Our forthcoming interests are the mobile submission of e-orders, the automated negotiation of the functional parameters of the e-ordering service, the adoption of a role based authorization system, the verification of the interoperability of the TOES components using two testing tools that have been developed by the WS-I Test Tools Working Group for interoperability assessment, the support of more e-order's XML schemas, the support of a XML key management, the integration with existed ERP systems, and the orchestration of the services using WS-business
ConClusIon, future work and aCknowledgMent
In this article, we have presented an architecture for secure e-ordering service. The proposed system is a unique tool for enterprises which desire to send and receive electronic orders via the Internet. The result(s) of these action(s) that use this system permit the enterprise and its employee's to manage the orders in an organized manner with accountability. The user provides the necessary data for the specific order via a browser-accessible form, and when the order is created, it is sent to the supplier, who immediately and automatically sends a confirmation reply of the order in electronic form.
From a technological point of view, the system is compliant and in accordance with state-of-the-art standards that constitute an interoperable, affordable, and scalable solution that address the security and privacy requirements which are described in Sections 2.2 and 
